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Abstract—The increasing complexity and criticality of indus-
trial automation systems, embodied by the concept of Industry
4.0, which brings together concepts like Cyber-physical systems,
the Internet-of-Things, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence,
calls for more formality in specifying the technology standards
underlying these systems. We define in this paper a formal
model of an Industry 4.0 machine-2-machine communication
protocol, Hermes, used in specifying electronic board transfers
in an assembly line. Our analysis of the formal specification
reveals that, despite the robustness of the protocol, many testing
scenarios have been ignored in the protocol standard and in
particular, scenarios that include simultaneous machine errors.
Therefore, our work paves the way for a better informed testing
strategy in Industry 4.0 systems that implement the protocol.
Index Terms—Communication Protocols, Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems, Formal Analysis, Industry 4.0, IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new wave of digitisation in manufacturing, dubbed
Industry 4.0, brings to the manufacturing industry the benefits
of many of the recent technological paradigms including
Cyber-Physical Systems, Internet-of-Things, Cloud computing
and Artificial Intelligence. This has lead to smarter and more
autonomous systems. Of these, the IPC-HERMES-9852 stan-
dard [1] (Hermes, henceforth) has emerged as a leading com-
munication protocol in the electronics manufacturing industry,
and as a replacement for the IPC-SMEMA-9851 Mechanical
Equipment Interface Standard [2]. The Hermes protocol de-
scribes necessary steps in transporting a Printed Circuit Board
(PCB) from one machine to another and a description of
the scenarios that may occur in the event of errors detected
at either the sending or the receiving machine. Hermes is
maintained by the Institute for Printed Circuits (IPC) and it is
hailed as a non-proprietary open protocol bringing the benefits
of Industry 4.0 to the electronics community.
As with any other protocol, more clarity and understanding
of the properties of the protocol and its operation can be gained
by following formal specification and analysis techniques. In
this paper, we specify the Hermes protocol formally using
a version of the pi-calculus language [3]. We also apply an
abstract interpretation to analyse the protocol for agreement
properties. These include agreement on the completeness, non-
completeness and non-starting of the PCB transfer between the
sending and receiving machines in the protocol.
We summarise our two major findings as follows:
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• Specifying the protocol formally has shown that a number
of error-detection scenarios were missed by the standard
document [1], as part of the protocol’s behaviour. The
document identified only 7 such scenarios, whereas we
found that there were 24 scenarios that needed considera-
tion. The significance of this finding is that it will lead in
the future to more comprehensive testing suites applied
to software implementations of the protocol by increasing
the coverage of these tests from 7 cases to 24. This will
further increase the robustness of those implementations
as a result. This basically means that implementations of
the protocol ought to be tested more than what the current
standard recommends in [1].
• Related to the above finding, the standard document [1]
does not consider simultaneous occurrences of errors –
only that a single machine detects an error at any single
point in time. This is indicated for each and every one of
the 7 scenarios highlighted in the document. However,
in reality, such errors may occur simultaneously, and
therefore it is necessary also to consider the simultaneous
triggering of the error-handling processes at both the
sending and receiving machines. This, as we show later
in more detail, could lead to these processes interacting
with one another.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
discuss related work in literature. In Section III, we give some
background on the Hermes protocol and the formal language
used in the modelling and analysis. In Section IV, we define
formally the Hermes protocol for the case of normal operation
and analyse the correctness of the protocol in relation to the
PCB transfer completion property. In Section V, we extend
this definition to be able to deal with errors, analysing for the
cases of non-started and incomplete PCB transfers. Finally, in
Section VI, we conclude and highlight future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Formal specification and analysis techniques have been
used extensively ever since their inception as a method for
increasing the dependability of systems and deepening our
understanding of the behaviour of critical systems. Industry
4.0, which brings together several paradigms including Cyber-
Physical Systems, the Internet-of-Things (IoT), Cloud com-
puting, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence among others,
poses particular challenges due to the high dimensionality
and complexity of the systems involved. Formal methods have
much to contribute to the demystification of such complexity
[4]. In fact, the important role that formal methods can play in
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systems was emphasised in works as early as [5], [6], [7], 
needless to say that this strong relationship emerged between 
the two worlds in the form of infamous methods like VDL 
[8], Z [9] and B [10]. Examples of early surveys highlighting 
cases where formal methods contributed to the enhancement 
of industrial systems include [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].
More recently, IoT protocols have had a direct relationship 
with industrial systems, both together sometimes referred by 
the term Industrial IoT (IIoT). Amongst the most widely 
modelled and formally verified I oT p rotocols i s t he MQTT 
protocol [16]. Various works, e.g. [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], 
have addressed issues with the reliability and security of the 
protocol using a variety of formal methods. Most notably, in 
[17], [18], it was discovered that the informal semantics of 
the protocol contained subtle ambiguities that undermined the 
protocol’s correctness. Other IoT protocols that have benefited 
from the application of formal methods include CoAP [22], 
which has been verified i n a  n umber o f w orks including 
[23], who used the Event Calculus [24] to generate a set 
of monitoring events for the run-time verification o f CoAP 
systems. By contrast, [25] used model checking techniques to 
analyse the flow of messages among CoAP nodes.
Apart from this work, other works have also addressed 
the problem of formally modelling the properties of Industry 
4.0 communication technologies. In [26], the authors stud-
ied some of the security properties of the Open Platform 
Communications (OPC) Unified Architecture (UA) [27] using 
the ProVerif static analysis tool [28]. One of the weaknesses 
of such tools, in addition to the complexity underlying their 
usage, is their reliance on the presence of explicit cryptography 
in the protocol in order to formalise security properties. As 
such, [29] used UML to semi-formally model UA.
In [30], the authors also used UML, particularly UML 
activities [31], as part of the Reactive Blocks [32], [33] 
model-driven approach to model control software in industrial 
automation. Similarly UML was combined with net condi-
tions/event systems [34] to model and validate automation 
systems in [35], particularly plants’ structures and dynamics. 
The formal specification part facilitated the checking of prop-
erties such as the lack of dangerous situations in the plant, 
robustness of the system in terms of the malfunctioning of 
sensors, avoidance of deadlocks and particularly of relevance 
to our work in this paper, the presence of ample checkpoints 
in any possible scenario of behaviour the system may follow.
Security has also been the subject of the application of 
formal verification t echniques i n t he c ontext o f I ndustry 4.0 
systems, particularly when it comes to the issue of the integra-
tion of various system components. In [36], for example, the 
Shibboleth federated identity and single-sign on protocol [37] 
was proposed as a solution to securely connect Fog clients 
and Fog nodes [38] in automation systems. High-level Petri 
nets [39] were then used to demonstrate the reliability and 
robustness of this connection. The various security issues that 
can arise in Industry 4.0 systems were highlighted in [40].
The approach adopted in this paper follows from a number 
of existing works [41], [17], [17], [18], which demonstrated 
the effectiveness of the method in analysing properties and
detecting issues with different systems and protocols. The
original theory underlying the abstract analysis framework was
defined in [42], to which we refer the reader for further detail.
To conclude, existing literature highlights the wide context
in which formal approaches can be utilised to improve the
specification of modern industrial systems and clarify ambigu-
ities in their designs in relation to a variety of properties, such
as reliability and security. It is this context, and its importance,
that has largely motivated the work presented in this paper.
III. BACKGROUND
We give in this section some background on the specifica-
tion of the Hermes protocol and the formal language used in
modelling the protocol.
A. The Hermes Protocol
The normal operation of the Hermes protocol is illustrated
in Figure 1, with alternative sequences of handshakes.
Fig. 1. The normal operation of Hermes [1] with alternative sequences.
An Upstream machine is a machine that sends a PCB
whereas a Downstream machine is a machine that receives the
PCB. Note that the protocol provides for two alternatives for
two of its message blocks. The first is related to the exchange
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able(), which simply allow each machine to indicate to the 
other that it is ready to commence the PCB transfer. After 
that, the Downstream machine starts the transfer by sending 
the StartTransport() signal. The second alternative sequence 
then commences and it is related to the final s tage o f the 
transfer, where either machine again can indicate before the 
other that it has completed the transfer. This is done using the 
pair of signals TransportFinished(Complete) and StopTrans-
port(Complete) signals. All across the protocol timeline, either 
machine can switch on and switch off its conveyor belt by 
performing Conveyor on and Conveyor off internal actions, 
respectively, at the appropriate points in time. Further details 
of the sequence of messages and their meaning can be found 
in [1], which also describes a few error-detection scenarios.
It is worth noting that despite the fact that Hermes is, 
in its essence, an Industry 4.0 machine-2-machine protocol, 
it nonetheless provides for connectivity with the Internet, 
since both the upstream and downstream machines can offer 
a TCP server that can be contacted on port 1248 for the 
purpose of receiving configuration m essages t o c onfigure the 
machines. This facilitates the deployment of a Hermes-based 
manufacturing line in an Industrial Internet-of-Things set-up.
B. The Process Algebra
The formal model of Hermes that we introduce later is based
on a version of the pi-calculus process algebra [3], which is a
synchronous message-passing model. We give an overview of
the syntax and semantics of this algebra.
C. Syntax and Structural Operational Semantics
We use the following syntax to define processes,
P,Q . . . ∈ P , where names are denoted as x, y . . . ∈ N :
P,Q ::= x〈y〉.P | x(y).P | τ.P | !P | (νx)P | (P |
Q) | (P+Q) | 0 | A | P [x = y]Q
The syntax corresponds to the synchronous pi-calculus [3]. A
process can perform any of the following actions: it can output
a message over a channel, x〈y〉.P , it can input a message over
a channel and use it to replace a parameter, x(y).P and it can
perform a silent internal action τ.P . A process can also restrict
the scope of a name (νx)P and can be combined with another
process in parallel, (P |Q), or in a non-deterministic choice,
(P+Q). A process can also be replicated, !P , to generate as
many copies of P as required or it can be passive and therefore
do nothing, 0. We can also call a definition of a process by
performing A where A def= P . Finally, the special construct,
P [x = y]Q, will evaluate the condition x = y and if true, it
will continue as P , otherwise as Q.
We omit the input parameter y in x(y).P and write x().P if
no message is expected. Similarly, we omit the message y in
x〈y〉.P if no such message exists and simply write x〈〉.P . We
call the set of free names of a process, fn(P ), such as x and
y in x〈y〉.P , x(u).P and P [x = y]Q, and the set of bound
names, bn(P ), such as u and y in x(u).P and (νy)P .
The structural operational semantics of the above version of
the pi-calculus is given in terms of the structural congruence,
≡, and the operational transition, τ−→, relations as shown in
Figure 2, where fn(P ) are the set of free names of P .
Rules of the ≡ relation:
(1) (P/ ≡, |,0) is a commutative monoid
(2) (νx)0 ≡ 0
(3) (νx)(νy)P ≡ (νy)(νx)P
(4) !P ≡ P | !P
(5) (νx)(P | Q) ≡ (P | (νx)Q) if x /∈ fn(P )
(6) P [x = y]Q =
{
P if x = y
Q otherwise
(7) A ≡ P , where A def= P
Rules of the τ−→ relation:
(8) x〈y〉.P | x(z).Q τ−→ P | Q[y/z]
(9) x〈〉.P | x().Q τ−→ P | Q
(10) τ.P τ−→ P
(11) P τ−→Q ⇒ (νx)P τ−→ (νx)Q
(12) P τ−→ P ′ ⇒ P | Q τ−→ P ′ | Q
(13) P τ−→ P ′ ⇒ P +Q τ−→ P ′
(14) P τ−→ P ′ ⇒ Q+ P τ−→ P ′
Fig. 2. The structural operational semantics of the pi-calculus.
The significance of these relations is that they demonstrate
how a process evolves. The definition of ≡ expresses how
the syntactic structure of the process can be altered without
any operational evolution. On the other hand, the definition of
τ−→ outlines how the process operates. The main rules here are
rules (8) and (9), which define how communications take place
resulting in the substitution [y/z] when a message is passed
(Rule (8)), and no substitution when no message is passed
(Rule (9)). More detail on the semantics of the pi-calculus can
be found in works like [3], [43].
On the other hand, in [42], [44], we defined a non-standard
name-substitution semantics for the pi-calculus, which when
abstracted using an approximation function, was capable of
yielding an abstract environment:
φ : N ] → ℘(N ]) ∈ D]⊥
where N ] represents the set of abstract names. Unlike N , N ]
is finite and as a result any element of the powerset of N ],
i.e. ℘(N ]), is also finite. The resulting semantic domain, D]⊥,
guarantees termination for an abstract interpretation computed
over it (with applications e.g. such as in [45]). The bottom
element of D]⊥, ⊥ = φ0, is the empty environment where
∀x ∈ N ] : φ0(x) = {}. N ] and consequently D]⊥ can be
constructed using some approximation function that keeps the
size of N ] finite by limiting the number of copies of input
parameter names and freshly created names.
The static analysis of a process, P , can then be obtained
through the application of a suitable abstract interpretation
function, A([P ])φ0 ∈ D]⊥. When analysing the specification
of a process, we use the resulting φ environment to formalise
4the definitions o f t he p roperties w e a re i nterested i n. A s a 
simple example, consider the following process:
P 
def
= (! x(y).0) | (! (νz)x〈z〉.0)
were we could apply an approximation that limits the number 
of copies of the input parameter y and the freshly generated 
message z, to a maximum of two such copies. Then we 
would obtain the following abstract environment, A([P ])φ0 = 
φexample, where:
φexample[y1 7→ {z1, z2}, y2 7→ {z1, z2}]
Defining a ny p roperty a mounts t o t he d efinition of  a suitable
predicate, z : D]⊥ → B, on the resulting abstract environment. 
For example, we could choose to say that y will be instantiated 
with its corresponding copy of the z message:
z(φexample) = z1 ∈ φexample(y1) ∧ z2 ∈ φexample(y2)
which is true. We keep sub-environments resulting from 
choices of process executions explicitly separate for clarity. 
For example, consider the following process:
Q 
def
= x(y).0 | (x〈z〉.0 + x〈t〉.0)
When analysed, A([Q])φ0 = φexample2, this would result in the 
following two sub-environments:
φexample2 = φ
′
example2[y1 7→ {z}] ∪ φe′′xample2[y1 7→ {t}]
which we prefer to keep separately, instead of writing:
φexample2[y1 7→ {z, t}]
IV. A FORMAL MODEL OF THE HERMES PROTOCOL
The formal model for the Hermes protocol reflects the two
machines specified in the Hermes protocol [1]: the upstream
and the downstream machines. These are formally defined in
Figure 3. This definition reflects the normal operation of these
machines without the presence of any errors (i.e. stop signals).
The conveyor-on and conveyor-off actions in the Hermes
specification document are modelled here for simplicity as
silent internal actions, τ . This is due to the fact that these
actions cannot be interrupted and therefore do not constitute
any externally observable behaviour. Running the full system,
System, corresponds to running the two machines in parallel:
System def= (UP | DP)
An important property of this protocol is to ensure that both
machines agree on whether they have completed the PCB
transfer successfully. We express this property as a predicate
on the result of analysing the protocol.
Property 1 (Agreement on PCB Transfer Completion):
Both machines, upstream and downstream, agree on the PCB
transfer completion iff the following predicate, z1, defined on
the result of analysing the protocol, φ, is true:
z1(φ) = ∃x ∈ bn(UP), y ∈ bn(DP) :
“Complete” ∈ φ(x) ⇔ “Complete” ∈ φ(y) 
This property captures the requirement that if one machine
believes it has completed the transfer of the PCB, the other
does as well, in whichever order that completion is signalled.
Applying our static analysis, A([System])φ0 = φ, to the
protocol specification of Figure 3, we obtain the following
two sub-environments:
φ = φ1[y
′ 7→ “Complete”, x 7→ y′] ∪ φ2[x′ 7→
“Complete”, y 7→ x′]
where both φ1 and φ2 satisfy the above PCB transfer com-
pletion predicate z1. In this case, we did not need to use any
approximation function since the set of names used is finite
by nature due to the lack of any infinite (replicated) behaviour
in the protocol’s definition.
V. ERROR TESTS
The definition of the Hermes protocol presented in Figure 3
of the previous section assumes normal operation and therefore
does not cater for situations when errors are detected by any
of the two machines, which could result in stopping their
operation. Hence, we define in this section an enhanced formal
specification that can handle such transport errors along the
lines of the scenarios captured in [1, §2.3.4].
Before we can do that, we need to define a mechanism in
the formal protocol specification to express the ability of the
Hermes protocol in testing for the presence of such errors. One
such mechanism for defining these tests can be specified using
the condition evaluation construct in the pi-calculus language:
state(ei).Pei [ei = “stop”]Qei
The communication channel, state, is used to receive from
the environment of the two machines any “stop” signals sent
to those machines whenever transport errors occur in them.
We use the enumerations, i ∈ N, to distinguish the different
copies of the input parameter, e, that receives such “stop”
signals from the environment. Process Pei will run if a “stop”
signal is received, otherwise Qei runs if the received signal is
different from “stop”. We call Pei the error-handling process.
For brevity, we use the following shorthand representation
of the above tests:
[ei](Qei) ≡ state(ei).Pei [ei = “stop”]Qei
As a matter of fact, [ei] becomes an alias to uniquely reference
the communication channel, state, input parameter, ei, and
the process, Pei . We stress here that these tests are part of
the operation of the protocol itself, not a method to test the
protocols behaviour.
The next question is where should such tests be positioned in
the protocol’s specification? The Hermes protocol [1, §2.3.4]
provides only a limited number of points at which such tests
are carried out (see the seven Scenarios U1a–D3). In our case,
we consider that any sequential composition point with an
action a ∈ {x(y), x〈y〉, τ} is a potential testing point that the
protocol could use to detect errors in machines:
a
test point︷︸︸︷. P
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UP def= machineready().boardavailable〈〉.UPcont +
boardavailable〈〉.machineready().UPcont
where,
UPcont
def
= starttransport().τ.
(τ.transportfinished〈“Complete”〉.stoptransport(x).0
+ stoptransport(x′).τ.transportfinished〈x′〉.0)
The Downstream Machine Process:
DP def= machineready〈〉.boardavailable().DPcont +
boardavailable().machineready〈〉.DPcont
where,
DPcont
def
= τ.starttransport〈〉.(transportfinished(y′).τ.stoptransport〈y′〉.0
+ τ.stoptransport〈“Complete”〉.transportfinished(y).0)
Fig. 3. A pi-calculus model of the Hermes v1.2 protocol in normal operation.
This implies that each machine should be able to be stopped
after each action it performs, allowing for better range of
detection of errors at more points in its operation.
Based on this, we redefine the formal specification of the
Hermes protocol, as in Figure 4, in order to incorporate the
ability to receive stop signals from the environment. The full
system, System, will now consist of the two machines running
in parallel with the environment, Env, as follows:
System def= (UP | DP | Env)
The environment process, Env, will always send either a
“continue” message, when there is no error to be signalled
to either machine, or a “stop” message, when some transport
error is detected. As a result, the definitions of UP and DP
need to be modified, from their normal definitions in Figure
3, to be able to detect “stop” messages and to react to any
error-handling behaviour such messages may initiate.
The specification of Figure 4 considers all possible points
in a process where an error can be tested, once that process
has commenced running (i.e. it has fired its first action). We
identified 24 such points, compared to the original 7 points that
were identified in the scenarios of [1, §2.3.4]. The error-testing
specification also modifies the normal operation specification
of Figure 3 by adding extra communication channels to cater
for the RevokeMachineReady and RevokeBoardAvailable sig-
nals resulting from transport errors. Both UP and DP deviate
to their error-handling processes once “stop” is received.
The individual error-handling processes, Pei , are defined
in Figure 5 for the upstream machine, and Figure 6 for the
downstream machine. We also indicate which of the scenarios
in [1] each error-handling process corresponds to, or none
if it does not correspond to any. An important observation
that one can make here is that whilst the specification of
[1] considers only scenarios where errors occur in either
machine, the specification does not consider the possibility
that errors may occur simultaneously in both machines. That
is, the environment of Figure 4 could “stop” both machines
at the same time. Due to the execution sequences of UP and
DP, this possibility is limited to the following pairs of tests:
([e1], [e
′
1]), ([e2], [e
′
2]), ([e3], [e
′
3]), ([e4], [e
′
4]), ([e4], [e
′
5]),
([e2], [e
′
5]), ([e5], [e
′
6]), ([e6], [e
′
6]), ([e7], [e
′
6]), ([e5], [e
′
10]),
([e6], [e
′
10]), ([e7], [e
′
10]), ([e8], [e
′
7]), ([e8], [e
′
8]), ([e9], [e
′
9]),
([e10], [e
′
11]), ([e11], [e
′
11]), ([e12], [e
′
12])
In most of these pairs, nothing will occur as the neither point
will offer actions that can synchronise with the other point in
the pair. However, in a few cases, we find that certain error-
handling processes may communicate with each other if both
are triggered at the same time, as their actions can synchronise.
This is the case for the following four pairs:
([e8], [e
′
7]), ([e8], [e
′
8]), ([e10], [e
′
11]), ([e11], [e
′
11])
Next, we apply our static analysis, A([System])φ0 = φ′, to the
above version of the protocol specification with error tests.
As a result, we obtain the following environment:
φ′ = (φ′1[x
′′ 7→ y′, y′ 7→ “NotStarted”] ∪
φ′2[x
′′′ 7→ y′, y′ 7→ “Incomplete”] ∪
φ′3[x
′′′′ 7→ y′, y′ 7→ “Incomplete”] ∪
φ′4[x
′ 7→ “Incomplete”, y′′ 7→ x′] ∪
φ′5[x
′ 7→ “Incomplete”, y′′′ 7→ x′] ∪
φ′6[x 7→ y′, y′ 7→ “Complete”] ∪
φ′7[x
′′′′′ 7→ y′, y′ 7→ “Complete”] ∪
φ′8[y 7→ x′, x′ 7→ “Complete”] ∪
φ′9[y
′′′′ 7→ x′, x′ 7→ “Complete”] ∪
φ′10[x
′′′′′ 7→ “Complete”, y′ 7→ “Complete”] ∪
φ′11[y
′′′′ 7→ “Complete”, x′ 7→ “Complete”] ∪
φ′12[x 7→ “Complete”, y′ 7→ “Complete”])
Each sub-environment part of φ′ represents a different path
of execution, depending sometimes on which error points are
triggered. This brings us to the following two properties.
Property 2 (Agreement on PCB Transfer Not Started):
Both machines, upstream and downstream, agree that the
PCB transfer has not started iff z2 is true on the result of
the analysis of the protocol, φ′, where:
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UP def=
machineready().([e1](boardavailable〈〉.([e2](UPcont) + revokemachineready().0)) +
revokemachineready().0) +
boardavailable〈〉.[e3](machineready().([e4](UPcont) + revokemachineready().0))
where,
UPcont
def
= starttransport().[e5](τ.[e6](
(τ.[e7](transportfinished〈“Complete”〉.[e8](stoptransport(x).[e9](0))) +
stoptransport(x′).[e10](τ.[e11](transportfinished〈x′〉.[e12](0))))))
The Downstream Machine Process:
DP def=
machineready〈〉.[e′1](boardavailable().([e′2](DPcont) + revokeboardavailable().0)) +
boardavailable().([e′3](machineready〈〉.([e′4](DPcont) + revokeboardavailable().0) +
revokeboardavailable().0))
where,
DPcont
def
= τ.[e′5](starttransport〈〉.[e′6](
(transportfinished(y′).[e′7](τ.[e
′
8](stoptransport〈y′〉.[e′9](0))) +
τ.[e′10](stoptransport〈“Complete”〉.[e′11](transportfinished(y).[e′12](0))))))
The Test Environment Process:
Env def= (! state〈“continue”〉.0) | (! state〈“stop”〉.0)
Fig. 4. A formal model of the Hermes v1.2 protocol with error tests.
Process Definition Description
Pe1
def
= 0 No corresponding scenario
Pe2
def
= revokeboardavailable〈〉.0 Corresponds to Scenario U1a
Pe3
def
= Pe2 No corresponding scenario
Pe4
def
= Pe2 No corresponding scenario
Pe5
def
= transportfinished〈“NotStarted”〉. Corresponds to Scenario U1b
stoptransport(x′′).0
Pe6
def
= τ.transportfinished〈“Incomplete”〉. Corresponds to Scenario U2
stoptransport(x′′′).0
Pe7
def
= transportfinished〈“Incomplete”〉. No corresponding scenario
stoptransport(x′′′′).0
Pe8
def
= stoptransport(x′′′′′).0 Corresponds to Scenario U3
Pe9
def
= 0 No corresponding scenario
Pe10
def
= τ.transportfinished〈“Complete”〉.0 No corresponding scenario
Pe11
def
= transportfinished〈“Complete”〉.0 No corresponding scenario
Pe12
def
= 0 No corresponding scenario
Fig. 5. Definition of error-handling processes for the upstream machine.
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Pe′1
def
= revokemachineready〈〉.0 No corresponding scenario
Pe′2
def
= Pe′1 Corresponds to Scenario D1
Pe′3
def
= 0 No corresponding scenario
Pe′4
def
= Pe′1 No corresponding scenario
Pe′5
def
= τ.Pe′1 No corresponding scenario
Pe′6
def
= τ.stoptransport〈“Incomplete”〉. Corresponds to Scenario D2
transportfinished(y′′).0
Pe′7
def
= τ.stoptransport〈“Complete”〉.0 Corresponds to Scenario D3
Pe′8
def
= stoptransport〈“Complete”〉.0 No corresponding scenario
Pe′9
def
= 0 No corresponding scenario
Pe′10
def
= stoptransport〈“Incomplete”〉. No corresponding scenario
transportfinished(y′′′).0
Pe′11
def
= transportfinished(y′′′′).0 No corresponding scenario
Pe′12
def
= 0 No corresponding scenario
Fig. 6. Definition of error-handling processes for the downstream machine.
z2(φ′) = ∃x ∈ bn(UP), y ∈ bn(DP) :
“Not Started” ∈ φ′(x) ⇔ “Not Started” ∈ φ′(y) 
z2 is satisfied by the φ′1 sub-environment. The z2 predicate
corresponds to error-handling in Scenario U1b in [1], where
the error occurs in the upstream machine before it starts
transporting the PCB. On the other hand, the next property
captures all errors that occur in both machines while the PCB
is in the middle of being transported.
Property 3 (Agreement on PCB Transfer Not Completed):
Both machines, upstream and downstream, agree that the PCB
transfer has not been completed iff z3 is true, where:
z3(φ′) = ∃x ∈ bn(UP), y ∈ bn(DP) :
“Incomplete” ∈ φ′(x) ⇔ “Incomplete” ∈ φ′(y) 
z3 is satisfied by φ′2 – φ′5 sub-environments. Of these, φ′2
corresponds to Scenario U2 and φ′4 corresponds to Scenario
D2 in [1]. Both φ′3 and φ
′
5 have no corresponding scenarios
and are therefore, a new result of this analysis.
It is also worth noting now that the PCB transfer completion
is satisfied not only due to the z1 predicate, which was
satisfied by the φ1 = φ′6 and φ2 = φ
′
8 environments, but also
due to the additional cases of φ′7, φ
′
9, φ
′
10, φ
′
11 and φ
′
12. In par-
ticular, the cases of φ′10 and φ
′
11 are a result of the communi-
cations between the pairs ([e8], [e′7]), ([e8], [e
′
8]), ([e10], [e
′
11])
and ([e11][e′11]) as indicated earlier. The case of φ
′
7 corre-
sponds to Scenario U3 and the case of φ′12 to Scenario D3
[1]. However, φ′9 is a new case that does not correspond to
any of the standard scenarios. We now define robustness as the
result that the two machines always agree on the same status
in any environment.
Lemma 1: The Hermes protocol is robust since z1∧z2∧z3.
Proof. z1 ∧z2 ∧z3 can be shown to be true from Properties
1–3. 
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude the paper, we have demonstrated that despite
the lack of testing of some parts of the Hermes protocol
in its original specification document [1], and the lack of
consideration for simultaneous errors, the protocol behaves
in the intended manner. We used a formal specification and
analysis approach to demonstrate the robustness of the pro-
tocol by demonstrating that the protocol behaves as expected
leading to upstream and downstream machine agreement in
every case where the transfer completes successfully, due to
lack of errors, or does not start or complete, due to presence
of errors at some stage of the board transfer process.
As part of future work, we plan to model and analyse
other Industry 4.0 communication technologies [46], e.g. the
Open Platform Communications (OPC) Unified Architecture
[27], Bosch’s Production Performance Management Protocol
(PPMP) [47] and the Data Distribution Service [48]. We also
plan to specify probabilistic and stochastic properties and
verify whether such properties hold in the Hermes protocol
and other Industry 4.0 protocols.
Another interesting area to extend this research to would
be the new IPC-CFX (Connected Factory Exchange) standard
[49], which transforms a Hermes-based manufacturing line
into a fully Industrial Internet-of-Things environment. As far
as we know, the CFX standard is not yet made open-source.
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